Personal Thoughts on The Atlantic Council’s “The Longer Telegram: Toward A New American China Strategy”
Preface
On evening of the 11th of February 2002, Chinese New Year Eve in Shanghai, we celebrated the coming year of the Dark Horse. Fireworks blazed for hours, exploding in many hues over the HuangPu. Coincidentally, the astrological sign, Dark Horse, is associated with knowing how to enjoy life, seek new and exciting events and be where the action is. That’s what we were doing – right in the epi-center of the China miracle!
For us, still wet behind the ears about China, we marveled at the people’s sincere joy as they approached moving from the year of the metal snake to the year of the horse. It should be noted here that metal snake people always do things in a planned and targeted way, making unremitting efforts toward achieving their goals. To get there, they display intense motivation, courage and perseverance. However, they are overconfident and even conceited sometimes, believing they are different from others with their emotions changing quickly – almost unstable.
What does that have to do with, “The Longer Telegram: Toward A New American China Strategy”? Quite a bit it turns out:
1. Most importantly, these two years are seminal years in China’s evolution. China emerged from its role as a low-tech, global factory resource into the world of advanced nations.
2. Hu Jintao, a young, technocratic party member followed his old guard predecessor, Jiang Zemin after China joined the WTO on 11th of December 2001.
3. The US policy toward China was driven by profit, not diplomatic engagement. There was little or no effort on America’s part, at the human level, to truly engage with China and its unique people’s historical culture. This was largely driven by the events of 11th of September 2001, but the lack of American cultural engagement with China preceded the tragic events of 2001 by at least a decade.
4. China in 2002 was motivated by its success of joining the WTO and like the Dark Horse was ready to ride into an adventurous future.
During the period between 2002 and the rise of Xi Jinping, the CCP and its cadres embarked on an adventurous course. Even as China’s economy grew at double digits, gained market share in global high value manufacturing and delivered wealth to its citizens the party’s leaders throughout the nation became corrupted. Deng Xiaoping’s guiding strategy and grand design to create wealth became abused. The Chinese people became very much aware of the “us and them” structure.
Corruption eroded the faith in the CCP. While Chinese, home grown private enterprises grew exponentially expanding to global scale, the general population had no safety net and little access to health insurance because of the residence requirement (Hokou: 户口). All this added an immense burden on families, especially rural peasants whose land was often simply taken to build homes or commercial property. In short, the “us and them” condition intensified with citizens actually protesting against this corruption of Deng’s strategy.
So, while Jack Ma, Zhang Yiming, Wang Jianlin, Robin Li and six hundred other Chinese “capitalists” became global rock stars acquiring billionaire status, citizens viewed themselves with growing frustration. The social contract between the CCP and the governed began to wear. It finally came to a head with the scandalous behavior of Bo Xilai former mayor of Dalian and Chongqing. Bo, the son of Bo Yibo, (One of China’s “Eight Great Eminent Officials”) was a Chinese communist prince. It was Bo’s corruption and his wife’s participation in the murder of a British citizen Neil Haywood which opened the path of Xi Jinping to position himself as a savior of the party.
The day-to-day life of most citizens were not appreciably impacted by the scandal. But the stage was set to launch the next chapter of both the CCP and China. Recognizing the righteousness of attacking corruption and privilege, Xi and his wing of the Party established itself as the “rectifiers”.
One last and seminal point about how we got to where we are in today’s USA/China relationship: Between China’s accession to the WTO and Xi’s election as party general secretary and president, the United States government and diplomatic corps essentially abrogated its role to engage and impact on China’s growth trajectory. The reality of the period during which China grew to a truly world power and the Atlantic Council’s analysis was fraught with American naiveté, greed and focus on unreal expectations that wealth would bring western-style democracy to China.
Here are four critical paths America missed or overlooked:
1. China for hundreds of years was the world’s largest and most influential economy. Modern Chinese leaders Sun Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao Zedong always had as their ultimate objective to restore China’s central role in the world’s economic system. Nothing new here, but American leaders completely discounted this fact and did not formulate a strategy to address and engage with this fundamental reality of the Chinese polity. Had the US been more acutely involved and appreciated this fact, we could have been able to mold our diplomacy and soft power to advocate for greater cooperation between governments.
2. America’s naïveté proved awesomely destructive and short sighted as our business leaders were the driving diplomatic front. They led investments in China for near term profit, not long-term benefits for the US. The consequence was the transfer of intellectual capital, technology and financial systems through (a.) Chinese legerdemain; (b.) the opening of American universities to Chinese students who returned to China with much knowledge of America’s technology; or (c.) outright poor negotiation by American businesses in China. America lost its edge by simply not protecting its assets – businesses unassumingly did not take seriously that their intellectual capital could be accessed from anywhere and took few precautions to keep it out of the hand of bad actors. Now, we point fingers at China for our own failure to protect our assets. Yes, it’s not proper to steal, but when the gate is open the chickens will run out. “All’s fair in love and war!”
3. The Chinese are essentially a homogeneous people. Of the roughly1.4 billion people living in mainland China, less than 5% are not Han. The west’s continued lecturing about the Uighurs or Tibetans is useless rhetoric. The Uighurs have exhibited separatist intent with a growing number of Uighurs becoming recalcitrant Islamic terrorists. America really wastes its political and diplomatic leverage on these “humanitarian” issues, while the world looks at us with our own left and right wing extremists lashing out against our democracy. You simply can’t lecture China when your own house is in disarray. All this does is harden China’s resolve to extend its way of economic expansion for its own benefit – China’s Belt and Road has already become an essential part of global economic expansion.
4. China’s unique form of control capitalism is a requisite in the managing the aspirations and lives of 1.4 billion people. The thought that western democracy would take hold in China has always been a foolish assumption. How could we expect a homogeneous people who are both the descendants and inheritors of a two and half millennial tradition of Confucianism be accepted to adopt western normative democratic structure in three decades? To take this concept seriously, employ it as a cornerstone of its China strategy, the US and the west must be severely faulted for their lack of understanding or just having no basic good sense. By predicating its engagement strategy on the expectation that China would simply democratize in a western sense was a foolhardy strategy. We are now paying for this immense failure in judgment by our government and corporate leaders.
Today, America and west are facing the prospect of a military conflict which truly we cannot hope to win – unless we radically address these four critical paths. The Atlantic Council’s piece on a new China strategy completely misses the need to address these critical paths.
Personal Thoughts on The Atlantic Council’s “The Longer Telegram: Toward A New American China Strategy”
In 1966, I read George Kennan’s “Long Telegram”. It was written with the premise that the Soviet Union would implode if the west established a coalition of economic and military force that would isolate the Soviet Union. Kennan’s main premise was the Soviet system was inherently weak and would crumble if “surrounded”. In a similar way, the anonymous piece presented by the Atlantic Council ascribes the “China problem” to one person: Xi Jinping. Undermine him and we can alter China’s direction with the hope of decreasing China’s rate of global influence.
“Xi has demonstrated that he intends to project China’s authoritarian system, coercive foreign policy, and military presence well beyond his country’s own borders to the world at large.”
President Xi enjoys a very high approval level from the Chinese people. What he plans to do is leverage the Chinese people’s ingenuity, new wealth and confidence to match the ambitions of his own people. Xi is a powerful character and autocratic, but he is also looked upon with much respect. Yes, there is dissention; yes, there are questionable domestic moves against personal freedoms; yes, Xi may have caused intense jealousy among the cadres which offer some opportunities to reduce his influence; but his vision for China’s future role as a new global hegemon is logical, reasonable and attainable.
This observation is in direct contradiction and obviates Anonymous’ basic premise:
“The wisdom in Kennan’s analysis was his profound appraisal of how the Soviet Union functioned internally and the development of a US strategy that worked along the grain of that complex reality. The same needs to be done with China.”
The author finishes that line of thinking by offering inconclusive evidence that Xi’s position is shaky because of party jealously, wealth accumulated by Xi and the CCP cadres’ fears. Not sure who this anonymous is, but they have completely missed the most critical issue in forming their suggested new strategy toward China: the Chinese will never return to the pre-2013 path. It simply is not an option when Xi and his brand of Socialism with Chinese characteristics is meeting the long-standing dreams of the Chinese people.
Thomas Friedman wrote in a recent New York Times piece that China was a better place to live the USA. Now think about that for a moment. If a thinker of Friedman’s caliber is writing this, how do you think the Chinese people are thinking?
The Atlantic Council’s piece does offer one clear point. Specifically:
“It would therefore be extremely hazardous for US strategists to accept that an effective future US China strategy should rest on an assumption that the Chinese system is destined to inevitably collapse from within—much less to make the “overthrow of the Communist Party” the nation’s declared objective. In fact, indulgence in politically appealing calls for the overthrow of the ninety-one-million-member CCP as a whole is strategically self-defeating. Such an approach only strengthens Xi’s hand as it enables him to circle elite political and popular nationalist wagons in defense of both party and country. The present challenge will require a qualitatively different and more granular policy response to China than the blunt instrument of “containment with Chinese characteristics” and a dream of CCP collapse.
From there our writer loses his way by either ignoring or falsely assuming a number of critical issues:
1. That China could become a different type of global power than that envisaged by Xi.
2. That the USA can change China’s objectives with a comprehensive operationalized strategy. A strategy essentially based on aggressive acts (with one exception) which will in no way impact on the Chinese trajectory. Once China has tasted real power and achieved its multigenerational objective of returning to global leadership, no archaic hegemonic regime can seriously impact on the Chinese future – except the Chinese people.
3. US world leadership has been negatively impacted since the 11th of September 2001. In two decades of weak leadership mostly focused on domestic politics and the need to secure elections, Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump neglected to fully pivot assets toward containing China. Now the Biden administration will simply continue this path, leaving gaping holes in the US/China engagement.
4. The many operationalized options listed are simply too late to be effectively implemented.
5. That by somehow undermining Xi we can alter China’s trajectory.
In short, take the head out and the body will crumple. That strategy is simply not workable. It’s a wild west movie plot – “High Noon” comes to mind. Get the bad guy and the good guys will take over and everyone will live happily ever after. That’s not China today – China is simply not a bad guy and is not perceived that way in most of the world. They are a leading trading partner for many nations, they provide essential infrastructure financing through Belt and Road, they are fully integrated into the world’s supply chains and most importantly the vast majority of Chinese people support their government.
Contrast that with America’s polarized politics, profligate spending accompanied by an increase in borrowing leading to the imminent decline of the US Dollar as the global currency. Further the Biden administration’s move to green economics will lead to a radical increase in energy costs with much of the expense allocated to international sources of energy like Iran, Venezuela and Russia. This will further erode the dollar’s value undermining any power the US may be able to muster through the dollar. The author of the Atlantic Council’s piece neglects to include these in their outline of operationalized points to combat China.
Reading through the anonymous piece, leaves huge gaps in logic. It’s pie in the sky written for a world which we no longer live in. China is not the Soviet Union. Going against a personality as the singular tenant of forming a new China strategy is unworkable and dangerous. Frankly, it is a foolish escapade. It is further naïve to expect Xi and the CCP cadres to allow themselves to be undermined by a failing US. Lastly, on the military issue, the US can simply no longer afford to enhance its military capabilities while simultaneously pivoting to our brand of socialism with American characteristics. It is military strength and resolve the Chinese will understand – and the US is simply is not coordinated enough to execute force projection that will tip the Chinese.
It is clear at this point, that old ways initially proposed by George Kennan to contain and lead to the demise of the Soviet Union are no longer a viable 21st Century option to contain China.
We need a new premise: China will not be contained.
Thoughts of Realism
Bill Clinton said it best and I paraphrase: “It’s the economy stupid”. Let’s start with the premise that China will not be contained. Let’s further understand that “losing face” is an unacceptable individual and collective Chinese trait.
Building a strategy around those two premises means seeking a strategy of win-win. Some critical paths to a new China strategy may include:
1. Focus on the history and aspirations of the Chinese people.
2. Understand that XI Jinping embodies those aspirations and is integral to the future of China.
3. Avoid the zero-sum game.
4. Recognize that the US will be unable to keep the dollar strong eliminating its single biggest point of leverage,
5. Account for the US move to socialism with American characteristics. This will result in a reduction of CAPEX investment and reduce research and development funding as tax structures will disincentivize investment.
6. Accept that military strength will be hobbled as funding dries up and racial theory initiatives erode preparedness and morale.
7. Energy costs will further erode individual spending – those funds will end up be transferred to bad actors like Iran, Venezuela and Russia.
8. Know that China will supersede the US as the leading economic and political player on the world stage.
With these paths to consider, a course of action can be plotted to engage and secure a peaceful transition between old and new hegemons. The most important is to assure a powerful and two-way economic relationship with China. Here are some thoughts of realism:
1. Stop with the pie in the sky dreaming we can protect Taiwan – we can’t and won’t. It’s a Chinese domestic problem.
2. Assure that trade and passage through the South China Sea remains open.
3. Identify and engage more deeply in the areas of Chinese American common interest. Make our potential enemy our economic partner as we collectively work to reshape the global economy.
4. Work with all relevant Pacific powers to lay out enforceable trade rules of participation in a Pacific trade zone.
5. Assure the Chinese accept the US/Japan special relationship. Japan is defensible and here we can place a red line.
6. Employ American soft power to leverage our world leading cultural innovations to impact on the Pacific Rim nations.
7. Consider finding a way to join and partner with China’s Belt and Road initiative. Bring American ingenuity to the execution of the initiative.
8. Fully integrate the North American market – then add a North/South American trade zone.
Summary
The commentary here is based on personal observations, reading of Chinese history and the Chinese peoples’ collective sense of being. I’m not a CIA analyst and have no access to government intelligence.
My belief is that the Anonymous piece is predicated on old, cold war thinking, not a modern digitized interconnected world. It’s operationalized paths function off a confrontational approach without taking into account the depth of the historical Chinese psyche and its modern iteration.
To effectively assure America’s continued economic stability as China moves to a global leadership role will ultimately require that the US to fully recognize that it’s China century, and to find a win-win path of broad economic and political engagement. No other route will result in a future stable world order.